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Abstract: Law-makers in many jurisdictions have recently created a range of new 
inchoate crimes: offences that aim to prevent an ultimate harm by criminalising 
conduct prior to the actual causing of that harm. Many observers have been worried 
by this development. They worry that these offences criminalise conduct that does 
not deserve conviction and punishment; that they are disproportionate in their impact 
on citizens and their liberties; and that their preventive aims would be better pursued 
outside the criminal law. This chapter asks whether these worries are persuasive. It 
does so by examining a range of inchoate crimes, including offences of attempt, 
endangerment, preparation, possession, and assistance and encouragement. It 
concludes that, while law-makers should be appropriately cautious about creating 
any criminal offence, there is no case for blanket scepticism about inchoate crimes.  
 
1. Inchoate Crimes: The Case for Scepticism 
 
When we hear the word ‘crime', we tend to imagine a narrow range of offences. 
Murder, assault, rape, robbery, vandalism, theft – for most of us, such offences of 
culpably causing harm to person and property constitute the core of the criminal law. 
However, the criminal law has always extended beyond this core, to encompass 
offences – often seriously punishable offences – that do not involve harm to others 
or their interests. Notable examples include inchoate crimes: offences that aim to 
prevent a given ultimate harm by criminalising conduct prior to the actual causing of 
that harm.  
 
In recent times, and across jurisdictions, law-makers have radically expanded the 
scope of inchoate criminality. Inchoate crimes themselves are not a recent invention: 
the common law tradition, for example, has long criminalised attempting, inciting, 
and conspiring to commit other crimes. However, these traditional, general offences 
are limited in their scope. They typically require an intention that the relevant 
ultimate harm occur, and they catch only a limited range of conduct: for example, 
                                            




attempt often requires an act proximate to the actual commission of the intended 
offence. By contrast, the newer inchoate offences target a wide range of conduct, 
and sometimes do not require intention – or indeed, any form of culpability – as to 
the ultimate harm. Metaphorically, these offences are said to target conduct that is 
increasingly remote from the harm that they aim to prevent.  
 
These newer inchoate crimes serve various purposes and have taken 
correspondingly various forms (Ashworth and Zedner 2014, pp. 96-102). Some are 
designed to deal with headline-grabbing threats, such as terrorists, sexual predators, 
and organised crime groups. Hence, law-makers have created offences of preparing 
to commit certain crimes, of supporting certain types of criminal activity, and of 
membership or participation in certain types of criminal group. Others are designed 
to deal with more mundane threats. For example, law-makers have created 
increasingly expansive offences of endangerment, and of possession of dangerous 
objects such as weapons or instruments of crime. More subtly, they have also re-
defined some traditional offences in an ‘inchoate mode’: that is, in a way that does 
not require the occurrence of the relevant ultimate harm. For example, fraud may be 
re-defined to require only misrepresentation, and not the deception or resulting loss 
that the offence aims to prevent.  
 
Many are worried by law-makers’ increasing readiness to create offences like these. 
The reasons behind this readiness are understandable: a key justifying aim of the 
criminal law is to prevent harm, and all else being equal, it is better to prevent harm 
by stopping crime before it occurs than by punishing it after it occurs. However, 
when law-makers focus exclusively on preventive efficacy, they ignore other factors 
that they ought to consider in making decisions to criminalise. They ignore the fact 
that criminalisation is not like other regulatory tools: it renders citizens liable to 
punishment, to the stigma of a criminal record, and to the coercive and intrusive 
enforcement actions of criminal justice officials. This fact, many argue, should lead 
law-makers to apply special constraints to the creation of inchoate crimes (Ashworth 
and Zedner 2014, ch. 5; Asp 2013; Husak 2007, ch. 3.III; Simester and von Hirsch 






The first and most serious worry that many people have about inchoate crimes is 
that they lead to unjust convictions and punishments. States are justified in 
convicting and punishing their citizens, this worry goes, only if those convictions and 
punishments are deserved; and convictions and punishments are deserved only if 
they are imposed for conduct that is both culpable and wrongful. To criminalise 
conduct that is not culpable or wrongful is therefore to facilitate unjust convictions 
and punishments. The worry is that many inchoate crimes do precisely this, because 
they criminalise conduct that is so remote from the harm that they aim to prevent 
(Simester and von Hirsch 2011, pp. 59-65, 71-73). 
 
This first worry is easiest to understand if we adopt a fact-relative conception of 
wrongdoing. On such a conception, whether conduct is wrongful depends on the 
actual facts of the situation. This means that conduct is wrongful only if it actually 
causes harm to others (or violates their rights, dignity, autonomy, and so on). To 
help see the point, we can re-phrase it in the language of reasons. Wrongful conduct 
is conduct in which we have decisive reason not to engage. And our reasons against 
engaging in given types of conduct derive from the actual welfare of others (or their 
rights, dignity, autonomy, and so on). If conduct has no impact on these things, then 
there is in fact no reason to avoid it, and it is therefore not wrongful (Raz 1975, pp. 
16-20; Gardner and Macklem 2002, pp. 442-450). Herein lies the problem with 
inchoate crimes: by definition, they criminalise conduct that has no such factual 
impact.   
 
A second worry about inchoate crimes is their potential disproportionality. Even if an 
offence criminalises only conduct that deserves punishment, it might yet be 
illegitimate, because its effects are disproportionate: simply put, its costs might 
outweigh its benefits. The worry is that inchoate crimes are especially likely to be 
disproportionate when compared to the traditional core crimes, for two reasons. 
First, the reasons for their creation are relatively weak: the need to censure and 
punish the conduct that they target is not as strong as it is for crimes of culpably and 
directly harming others. Second, the reasons against their creation are relatively 
strong: they restrict citizens’ liberties to a greater extent, and afford expansive 
enforcement powers that are easily abused. Again, law-makers must be sure to 




efficacy will tend to obscure them (Ashworth and Zedner 2014, pp. 103-105; 
Feinberg 1984, pp. 190-193; compare generally Horder 2012).  
 
A third, related worry is that the creation of these offences might prove unnecessary. 
Even if the benefits of criminalisation would outweigh its costs, it might still be 
unjustified, if an alternative to criminalisation is available that would be preferable, all 
things considered. Again, law-makers must consider the unique features of 
criminalisation as a type of regulation. Do they really need to subject inchoate 
conduct to conviction and punishment, or would a non-punitive response suffice? 
Since the reasons for creating these offences are mainly reasons of preventive 
efficacy, other interventions might prove more appropriate: for example, non-criminal 
regulation or preventive restrictions of liberty (Ashworth and Zedner 2012, pp. 562-
570). Alternatively, even if criminalisation is appropriate, law-makers should avoid 
creating offences that are more extensive than necessary in their scope (Husak 
2007, pp. 153-159, 168-176; compare again Horder 2012, pp. 85-92).  
 
A fourth and final worry is that inchoate crimes are prone to fail even in their own 
preventive aims. By definition, these offences criminalise conduct that does not 
cause the ultimate harm that they aim to prevent; thus, the state need not prove in 
court any causal connection between the relevant conduct and the relevant harm. 
Instead, law-makers must satisfy themselves in advance that the former contributes 
causally to the latter – or at least, that we can prevent the latter by criminalising the 
former. However, law-makers are not social scientists: they are likely to get such 
judgements wrong, and in today’s political climate, they are likely to err on the side 
of risk-aversion. In other words, they will tend to create inchoate crimes where doing 
so will not actually prevent the relevant ultimate harm. Since prevention is the 
purported justification for these offences, law-makers must again take special 
precautions to avoid such mistakes (Asp 2013, pp. 33-34; Baker 2007, pp. 376-381; 
Husak 2007, pp. 145-153). 
 
On the face of it, then, we have a strong case for scepticism about inchoate crimes 
and their expanding scope. But is this case persuasive? I will suggest that it is not. 
While each of the above worries stems from a legitimate concern, they do not justify 




worry – that inchoate crimes lead to unjust convictions and punishments – illustrates 
this point most clearly. The fact-relative type of wrongdoing described above cannot 
plausibly be required for legitimate criminalisation. And once we identify other types 
of wrongdoing that might suffice for this purpose, inchoate crimes no longer seem 
problematic, in and of themselves.   
 
The three remaining worries are more persuasive, but again, fail to justify blanket 
scepticism about inchoate crimes. Law-makers should certainly consider the 
necessity and proportionality of all new offences, and the likelihood that they will 
achieve their preventive aims. But while some inchoate crimes undoubtedly fail on 
these criteria, others succeed. The reasons against creating such offences vary in 
their strength. And the reasons in favour include the strongest reasons for 
criminalisation available to law-makers: the prevention of serious, wrongful harm. In 
summarising the legitimacy of inchoate criminalisation, the best we can say is 
therefore: it’s complicated. In what follows, I will explore some of this complexity, by 
examining a range of examples of inchoate crimes.  
 
2. Unleashing Risk: Complete Attempts and Endangerments 
 
Consider first a type of inchoate conduct that has long been criminalised in many 
jurisdictions: complete attempts. Complete attempters intend to cause harm, and 
have done everything that they need to do in order to do so; but for whatever 
reason, their plans fail. To take a textbook example: an assassin loads their gun, 
takes perfect aim, and shoots at their intended victim, only for a passing bird to get 
in the way and take the bullet. One could try to argue that it is illegitimate to 
criminalise complete attempters like this assassin. They have not done anything 
wrong, in the fact-relative sense: reasons against action derive from people’s actual 
welfare (or rights or whatever), and no-one’s welfare is damaged by the assassin’s 
failed attempt. Yet the view that such conduct may not be criminalised seems 
dangerously false. And indeed, if legal systems criminalise any inchoate conduct at 
all, it is conduct like the assassin’s. 
 
The obvious explanation for this is that complete attempts are wrongful in a different 




targets, they impose risks on them: their conduct is likely to cause them serious 
harm, and they relinquish full control over whether that harm occurs. Moreover, their 
conduct is unjustifiable: they lack good reason for imposing such risks. Their conduct 
is thus wrongful, even though – ultimately and with any luck – the relevant harm 
might not occur.  
 
The wrongness of unjustified risking is easy enough to understand. Perhaps true 
wrongness derives from actual harmfulness; but in the real world, the actual 
harmfulness of our actions is rarely certain in advance. We must therefore rely on 
judgements about risk: about the harms that our actions might cause, about the 
probability of their occurrence, and about whether these possible harms outweigh 
the possible benefits of our actions. Judgements about risk are not, strictly speaking, 
fact-relative. Rather, they are belief- and evidence-relative: they are judgements of 
how frequently we might expect a harm to occur, given what we believe about the 
situation or the evidence available to us. However, precisely because we often have 
only limited evidence about the results of our actions, such judgements can and 
should play a genuine role in guiding our conduct. Even if risks are not factual 
wrongs, they can thus be wrongs for which we may fairly be blamed – including, 
potentially, through criminal conviction and punishment.  
 
By recognising the wrongness of unleashing risk, we can also explain the potential 
legitimacy of another group of inchoate crimes: endangerment offences. Whereas 
attempts involve risks of intended harm, endangerment involves risks of unintended 
harm. Most endangerment offences criminalise only specific types of risky conduct: 
stock examples are offences of careless or dangerous driving. But some jurisdictions 
also criminalise the unleashing of risks more generally, through offences of reckless 
endangerment. These offences are not ‘general’ in the same sense as the traditional 
inchoate crimes: they do not create an auxiliary form of liability that applies to all 
offences. Rather, they criminalise the risking of certain harms (such as death or 
injury) without requiring conduct of specific types (such as driving). Since such 
conduct can be wrongful, the state might be justified in convicting and punishing 





It does not follow, of course, that law-makers should create general offences of 
reckless endangerment. Even if these offences target wrongful conduct, their 
creation might be disproportionate, because of their unwelcome side-effects. By 
definition, these offences catch a wide range of conduct: often, the only significant 
limitations on their scope are evaluative criteria, such as the unjustifiability or 
unreasonableness of the relevant risk. But the inevitable vagueness of such criteria 
grants significant interpretive power to prosecutors and courts. They are left to make 
what are effectively policy decisions about the reasonableness of risky conduct of 
different types – decisions that, arguably, they are not best-placed to make. A 
powerful example is the widespread use of reckless endangerment provisions to 
prosecute people for transmitting HIV and other sexually communicable diseases. 
Whether such conduct should be criminalised is a difficult and delicate issue; 
arguably, therefore, it should be settled by legislators rather than officials (Tadros 
2001; Clarkson 2005, pp. 137-143).  
 
By contrast, law-makers have relatively strong reasons to criminalise some specific 
types of risky conduct. Doing so ensures that we can prevent and punish the 
unleashing of serious risks, while avoiding unwelcome effects like those just 
described. This is true especially in regulated contexts – such as driving, 
environmental protection, and health and safety at work – where the applicable 
standards of care can easily be clarified and publicised. Of course, there are also 
problems with relying solely on specific endangerment offences. The resulting law is 
complex and piecemeal: it fails to catch some risky conduct that we might want to 
prevent and punish. But the desirability of prevention and punishment do not, by 
themselves, legitimise criminalisation. Given the drawbacks of general 
endangerment offences, they are less readily justifiable than their specific 
counterparts (Clarkson 2005; Duff 2005, pp. 57-59).  
 
3. Preparatory Offences 
 
To recognise the wrongness of unleashing risk, however, is not a big concession for 
the inchoate crime sceptic. The most worrisome inchoate crimes target risks of harm 
that have not yet been unleashed: that is, where the ultimate harm will occur only if 




party. These offences are referred to variously as preventive, pre-emptive, 
prophylactic, or pre-inchoate offences. Their most discussed sub-category is 
preparatory offences: offences that criminalise conduct performed with the intention 
of causing harm, but at a relatively early stage in the actor’s plan, before the risk of 
that harm is finally unleashed.  
 
The view that preparatory conduct is not wrongful, and therefore may not be 
criminalised, has radical implications. It de-legitimises not only many of the newer 
inchoate crimes, but also the traditional, general inchoate offences. Consider liability 
for attempting crime. Although jurisdictions vary in the extent to which they do this, 
many criminalise some preparatory conduct through the general offence of attempt. 
Put differently, many jurisdictions recognise that there can be incomplete attempts: 
attempts where actors have not yet done all that they need to do in order to cause 
their intended harm. For example, imagine again an assassin who has loaded their 
gun, aimed at their victim, and placed their finger on the trigger. This time, however, 
the police intervene before any shots are fired – before any risk of harm is 
unleashed. To punish this assassin – indeed, to punish them as an attempted 
murderer – will strike many as unproblematic. Could the criminalisation of their 
conduct really be illegitimate? 
 
Some bite the bullet and answer ‘yes’. To decriminalise such conduct might seem 
radical, but that is the price we must pay for avoiding unjust punishments. 
Preparatory actors, even incomplete attempters like our assassin, have not yet done 
anything wrong: they have not yet caused or unleashed any risk of harm. Such 
actors, the argument will go, have merely formed an intention to do harm. But 
forming a harmful intention is not, by itself, a culpable and wrongful act. Intentions 
are always revocable: as autonomous agents, we can always abandon them, and 
we retain full control over whether they will lead to harmful action. Of course, we 
may think badly of those who form harmful intentions. We may even take coercive 
preventive action against them, if this proves necessary. But when it comes to 
criminal conviction and punishment, preparatory conduct simply is not wrongful – 
and so states must give us ‘room to repent’ (Alexander and Ferzan 2009, ch. 6; 
2012a; 2012b; for different arguments for similar results, see e.g. Asp 2013, pp. 35-





But while preparatory conduct admittedly neither causes nor risks the relevant 
ultimate harm, it can arguably be wrongful in other ways. First, although preparatory 
conduct does not unleash a risk of harm, it can increase the probability that such a 
risk will be unleashed in the future. As criminal plotters progress with their plans, 
they take more of the steps that are necessary to ensure their success. They also 
progressively re-affirm and concretise their harmful intentions; they repeatedly 
confront the opportunity for abandonment and fail to take it (Ohana 2007, pp. 117-
126). This line of thought provides a stronger justification for criminalising the later 
stages of preparation than the earlier stages: it more readily justifies criminalising 
assassins with their finger on the trigger than would-be assassins researching the 
heights of local rooftops. Nevertheless, it is an attractive explanation of why 
preparatory conduct might be wrongful, since it remains grounded in the relationship 
between that conduct and the occurrence of the ultimate harm. 
 
Still, this explanation cannot fully rationalise the criminalisation and punishment of 
preparatory conduct. Much preparatory conduct, even late-stage preparatory 
conduct, does not increase the risk that the actor will succeed: this may remain 
unlikely, due to external circumstances, the actor’s own incompetence, or just plain 
bad luck. Moreover, the thought fails to capture why many are comfortable with the 
criminalisation of some preparatory acts. Compare again the law of attempts. 
Attempts are not criminalised (only) because they risk completion: some criminal 
attempts, such as impossible attempts, carry no such risk. Rather, we criminalise 
attempts because they involve trying to commit a crime (Yaffe 2010, pp. 27-31). 
Analogous things seem true of preparatory conduct: acting on an intention to cause 
harm can itself deserve punishment, regardless of the probability of eventual 
success.  
 
This leads us to a second explanation of the wrongness of preparatory conduct: 
acting on an intention to do wrong is itself wrongful (Tadros 2016, ch. 16). At the 
outset, we must acknowledge that this explanation is controversial. It requires us to 
accept that our mental states – the intentions with which we act – can render our 
otherwise-permissible conduct impermissible. This phenomenon has proved difficult 




must acknowledge that these intuitions are strong. Those who have made 
substantial progress with a criminal plan, but then abandoned it, seem materially 
different from those who have never made such a plan: we may blame the former for 
what they have done, at least to an extent. Indeed, the intended victims of such 
plans could plausibly even feel wronged, were they to learn of them. Such reactions 
suggest that preparatory conduct might be wrongful in itself, and therefore potentially 
a legitimate target for criminalisation and punishment (Duff 2012, pp. 134-142; 
Levenbrook 1980, pp. 58-59).  
 
However, the view that preparatory conduct is wrong in itself might also be thought 
to have radical implications. It suggests that very early-stage preparatory conduct – 
conduct that seems outwardly to be entirely innocent – can potentially be legitimately 
criminalised. To see the problem, consider an example of a very broad preparatory 
offence: the offence of preparing acts of terrorism, under section 5 of the UK’s 
Terrorism Act 2006. This offence criminalises anyone who intends to either commit 
or assist an act of terrorism, and who ‘engages in any conduct in preparation for 
giving effect to [this] intention’. Suppose that a would-be terrorist forms an intention 
to bomb a city’s metro system. Acting on this intention, they download a metro map, 
to see which stations might be suitable targets. Downloading a metro map, one 
might argue, is entirely innocent conduct. Yet in this case, under UK law, it is a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for life. Many will find this objectionable, suggesting that 
action on wrongful intentions does not, in fact, warrant punishment in and of itself.  
 
To infer from this intuition that early-stage preparatory conduct cannot be wrongful 
is, however, too quick. The wrongness of a given type of conduct might be 
necessary for its legitimate criminalisation, but it is not sufficient: even if it is wrong 
for prospective terrorists to buy metro maps, it does not follow that this should be 
criminal. And indeed, law-makers have good reasons to be cautious about 
criminalising early-stage preparation. These reasons derive especially from how 
such conduct must be proved. Early preparatory acts are often distinguished from 
truly innocent conduct only by the intention with which they are performed. But by 
definition, this intention cannot be inferred from the acts themselves: it must instead 
be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Likely sources of such evidence include 




to see how, in relying exclusively on such sources, courts and prosecutors might err 
in their findings of harmful intent.  
 
Besides this obvious risk of unjust convictions, the criminalisation of early-stage 
preparation also risks intrusive enforcement. Officials will easily form suspicions of 
terrorist intent. But to confirm those suspicions, they will need to investigate 
suspects’ opinions and associations – most probably through covert surveillance, or 
seizure of their phones or computers. Broad preparatory offences are thus likely to 
damage citizens’ liberty and privacy. Meanwhile, the wrongness of ‘buying metro 
maps with intent’ may be relatively modest; a censuring and punitive response to 
such conduct may not be urgently needed. In short, the costs of criminalising such 
early-stage preparation may greatly outweigh the benefits – even if, in theory, 
conviction and punishment for such conduct would be just.  
 
This need not be true, by contrast, for offences that criminalise only late-stage 
preparation. Consider another type of preparatory conduct that is now criminalised in 
many jurisdictions: the ‘grooming’ of children for sexual purposes. Compared to the 
terrorist preparation offence described above, grooming offences often criminalise 
only a limited range of conduct. For example, they might criminalise only adults who 
have contacted a child over the internet on multiple occasions, and who have 
actually travelled to meet that child. Those who have reached this stage in their 
plans are highly likely both to intend to abuse the child and to succeed in doing so. 
Although some ostensible groomers are indeed fantasists, they quit their plans at 
earlier stages. By limiting grooming offences in these ways, law-makers thus 
minimise their impact on those who are not prospective abusers, and focus on the 
conduct that there is strongest reason to punish (Sorell 2017; Ohana 2006, pp. 30-
31). Grooming offences are thus more likely to be proportionate than offences 
encompassing early-stage preparation.  
 
Some might insist, however, that this is not a satisfactory reply to concerns about the 
criminalisation of outwardly innocent conduct. Such criminalisation, they might 
argue, is objectionable in principle. While the above reply gives valid reasons 
against such criminalisation, these reasons could be outweighed, if the ultimate 




terrorism. But, the argument might continue, this cannot be right. We can and should 
distinguish between wrongful and innocent types of preparatory conduct. The former 
might include (say) building a bomb and putting it on a train. The latter might include 
buying matches or downloading maps. The mere fact that the latter conduct is 
intended to facilitate the former is not enough to render it wrongful – or at least, 
wrongful in a sense that should interest the criminal law (Simester 2012; compare 
Brudner 2009, pp. 108-130).  
 
This purported distinction between wrongful and innocent preparatory conduct 
cannot, however, be drawn satisfactorily. The idea that some conduct is inherently 
innocent is perhaps plausible. But it is plausible because of our pre-existing ideas 
about why we would engage in conduct of different types. There are many 
imaginable innocent reasons for downloading maps; there are no such reasons for 
building and setting a bomb. The puzzle is how such generalisations about types of 
conduct could influence the permissibility of token preparatory acts. If I download a 
map for terrorist purposes, my reasons are not innocent. How could the fact that 
other people regularly download maps for innocent purposes grant me the 
permission to do so for terrorist purposes? True, this fact might make my terrorist 
purpose more difficult to prove – which, as noted above, generates reasons against 
criminalising such conduct. But how it could have normative force – how it could 
render my conduct non-wrongful – is difficult to see (compare Tadros 2016, pp. 314-
315).  
 
Conviction and punishment for preparatory conduct, then, do not seem inherently 
unjust. But even so, there remains a further objection to the criminalisation of such 
conduct: that there are alternative ways of dealing with it that law-makers should 
prefer. In particular, they could authorise preventive restrictions of liberty for those 
who are preparing criminal attacks. Law-makers should prefer this option, it might be 
argued, because it is a more parsimonious means of achieving their aims. The main 
reasons for creating preparatory offences arise from their potential to prevent harm – 
and not from the need to censure or punish the conduct that they target. We should 
thus prefer a legal regime that prevents harm without censuring or punishing. 
Moreover, such a regime allows the state to tailor its response to the threat posed by 




preparatory conduct in general terms, such as the expansion of enforcement powers 
and the restriction of innocent citizens’ liberties. Law-makers should thus prefer such 
a regime, even if conviction and punishment for preparatory conduct can in theory 
be just (Ferzan 2011; Alexander and Ferzan 2012a; compare Ohana 2006). 
 
This objection highlights an important point, but once again, it is not decisive against 
all preparatory offences. If law-makers are considering such offences solely for 
reasons of preventive efficacy, then they should certainly also consider other, less 
costly means of achieving this aim. But as we have seen, the reasons behind 
preparatory offences need not be solely preventive. Some late-stage preparatory 
conduct – which evidences a firm intention to cause harm and makes the occurrence 
of that harm significantly more likely – may indeed warrant a censuring and punitive 
response. (Although exactly how serious a response may be difficult to determine: 
compare Alexander and Ferzan 2012b, pp. 111-117; Duff 2012, pp. 133-134.) Nor 
are preventive restrictions of liberty necessarily a less costly option than 
criminalisation. Existing regimes of such restrictions are in some ways more costly: 
they ground liability in predicted dangerousness rather than proven past conduct, 
and they avoid the procedural protections afforded to defendants in the criminal 
justice system (see generally Ashworth and Zedner 2014; compare Ferzan 2011, pp. 
177-186, arguing that these costs can be avoided). Whether such restrictions are 
preferable to criminalisation must therefore be judged on a case-by-case basis.  
 
In short, while law-makers should indeed be cautious about creating preparatory 
offences, there is probably no decisive objection to their doing so. Unless we take 
the radical view that all wrongs involve harming or risking – in which case, even the 
criminalisation of attempts is illegitimate – we should accept that preparatory 
conduct can potentially be legitimately criminalised. Admittedly, the view that 
preparatory conduct is wrong in itself is also problematic. But at least for late-stage 
preparatory conduct, for which there is no innocent explanation, this view will surely 
attract support. All things considered, criminalisation seems a potentially appropriate 







4. Indirect Endangerment 
 
A second type of preventive or pre-emptive offence is offences of indirect 
endangerment. These offences are similar to preparatory offences, in that the 
occurrence of the relevant ultimate harm depends on someone’s future conduct. But 
whereas preparatory offences concern the actor’s own future conduct, offences of 
indirect endangerment concern the conduct of third parties. They are, put simply, 
offences of assisting or encouraging the potential harmful conduct of others. Herein 
lies the fundamental worry about these offences: by definition, the relevant ultimate 
harm seems to be the responsibility of the third party, rather than the person 
criminalised. Can it be just to convict and punish citizens for taking a risk that other 
people will cause harm? 
 
Andrew Simester and Andreas von Hirsch (2011) answer that this is not always just. 
The problem, they say, is fair imputation: what makes it fair to impute to one person 
the autonomous choices of another person? In truth, however, the language of 
imputation does not accurately capture their concern with offences of indirect 
endangerment. For their worry is not that these offences criminalise those who lack 
causal responsibility: surely we can contribute causally to ultimate harms by 
contributing to others’ harmful actions (Simester and von Hirsch 2011, pp. 59-63). 
Rather, their worry is that these offences criminalise those who have not acted 
wrongly. Ordinarily, they think, our actions do not become wrongful merely because 
they might lead to other people acting wrongly. In justifying offences of indirect 
endangerment, the key question for law-makers is thus the normative relevance of 
the prospect that third parties might cause the relevant ultimate harm. Why does this 
prospect render the criminalised conduct wrongful (Simester and von Hirsch 2011, 
pp. 71-73)?  
 
The answer to this question, Simester and von Hirsch argue, depends on the actor’s 
normative involvement in the third party’s conduct. It is not enough to show a causal 
link between the actor’s conduct and the ultimate harm, even an entirely foreseeable 
one; the actor must also be responsible for that harm, in the sense that it is his or 
her ‘lookout’ (Simester and von Hirsch 2011, pp. 63-65). Sometimes, such 




responsible for the third party’s conduct. But absent such special responsibility, 
actors must make themselves responsible, by ‘affirming or underwriting’ the conduct. 
Those who intentionally assist or encourage another’s harmful conduct are easily 
seen as affirming or underwriting it. But the same is not true for those who assist or 
encourage harm unintentionally – who do things that risk helping or inspiring others 
to cause harm, but without meaning to do so. To justify the criminalisation of such 
conduct, say Simester and von Hirsch, something more is required (2011, pp. 79-85; 
for an alternative view, compare Duff 2005, pp. 62-64). 
 
To illustrate the implications of this view, consider conduct that risks encouraging 
others to cause harm. Law-makers may be justified in criminalising such conduct, 
Simester and von Hirsch would argue, if the encouragement is intentional: here, 
there is sufficient normative involvement in the ultimate harm to render the 
encouragement wrongful. General inchoate offences of inciting or soliciting crime, 
which typically require such an intention, are thus potentially legitimate. By contrast, 
if the encouragement is unintentional, then the required normative involvement is 
probably missing. Consider, for example, the offences of encouraging and glorifying 
terrorism that have been created in some jurisdictions. These offences extend 
beyond direct incitement to criminalise abstract statements of support for certain 
ideologies, or portrayals of terrorist acts in a way that risks inspiration or imitation 
(Hunt 2007; Petzsche 2017). Again, the point is not that we lack a proven, 
foreseeable causal link between such conduct and the ultimate harm of terrorist 
attacks. The point is that it is illegitimate to criminalise such conduct even if there is 
such a link: without further normative involvement in the ultimate harm, such conduct 
is not wrongful and thus may not be punished (Simester and von Hirsch 2011, pp. 
82-83).  
 
Many have been influenced by Simester and von Hirsch’s approach to offences of 
contributing to another’s crimes (see e.g. Ashworth and Zedner 2014, pp. 111-113; 
Baker 2007; Dempsey 2005; Levanon 2012; Wallerstein 2007a). Yet despite its 
influence, it fails to provide compelling reasons for scepticism about such offences. 
The argument is meant to show that conviction and punishment for these offences is 
often unjust: that the conduct that they target is often non-wrongful. It therefore rests 




our reasons to avoid causing harm to others. Only if we are normatively involved in 
those actions, the argument must go, are these reasons reinstated. But it is unclear 
why these reasons would be eliminated, simply because the causal route to 
(potential) harm goes through a third party. As we saw earlier, it is wrong to unleash 
an unjustifiable risk of harm to others; so why would this become non-wrongful, 
simply because the risk takes the form of another person’s actions? Simester and 
von Hirsch do not provide an answer, and as long as we accept that we can 
contribute causally to one another’s actions, it is hard to see where one might be 
found (Cornford 2013, pp. 492-494; Alexander and Ferzan 2018, pp. 19-24). 
 
It doesn’t automatically follow, of course, that offences of indirect endangerment are 
legitimate. While we generally have reasons to avoid assisting or encouraging 
others’ harmful conduct, we also have reasons to be cautious about criminalising 
such assistance or encouragement. One reason is that conduct can be socially 
valuable, all things considered, despite assisting or encouraging harm as a side-
effect. If the risks of such harm are sufficiently small, and the social value sufficiently 
large, then such conduct might not be wrongful: although it involves a risk of harm 
from third parties, that risk might be justifiable. For example, discussions or 
portrayals of terrorist violence might contribute slightly to radicalisation, but also 
contribute greatly to artistic work, academic research, or important debates of social 
and political morality. The latter benefits might justify the former risk – in which case, 
it would be unjust to convict and punish citizens in respect of such discussions or 
portrayals.  
 
A further justification for conduct that might assist or encourage others to cause 
harm derives from our liberty interests. If we are forced to refrain from such conduct 
because it might contribute to others’ wrongful actions, then in effect, our liberties 
are restricted by others’ propensities to act wrongfully. Again, such interference with 
our options is no licence to ignore the fact that our conduct might assist or 
encourage harm. But it might contribute modestly to the justification of those risks: 
plausibly, we have an interest not only in our liberties themselves, but also in their 
immunity from wrongful restriction by others. This interest might help to justify 
conduct that assists or encourages harm, and thus tell against its punishment, when 





Another reason for caution about offences of indirect endangerment is their 
tendency to produce chilling effects. These effects result from the enforcement 
powers that these offences afford and how these powers can be used in practice. 
For example, suppose that law-makers try to address the concern just mentioned: 
they insist that unintended risks of encouragement are criminal only if they are 
unjustified. Even so, we should remain sceptical about an offence defined in this 
way. As we saw earlier, an unjustifiability criterion provides little concrete guidance 
to officials. They are thus likely to interpret it in an unduly risk-averse way: they are 
likely to prosecute and convict some people whose conduct was actually or at least 
arguably justified. This is worrying not only because of the unjust punishments to 
which it will lead, but also because of the conduct that it will deter. If citizens wish to 
avoid involvement with the criminal justice system, then they will have to avoid 
certain valuable forms of expression – sometimes even justified forms. Worse, this 
effect will be especially strong among particular cultural and ideological groups – 
often already marginalised – on whom officials are known to focus. These effects 
might render these offences disproportionate, even when they target conduct whose 
punishment would be just (Cornford 2013, pp. 499-502). 
 
A final reason for caution is that these offences are prone to fail in their preventive 
aims – especially where they do not require proof that the conduct criminalised 
makes the ultimate harm more likely. This is true of some of the terrorist 
encouragement offences mentioned above: although these offences require 
‘encouraging’ conduct, they may not require that anyone actually be encouraged to 
commit terrorist acts. Theorists have long doubted whether the causal links between 
media communications and behaviour are strong enough to ground criminalisation 
(see e.g. Feinberg 1984, pp. 238-240). And more recently, these doubts have been 
strengthened through empirical research. One recent review of meta-studies 
suggests that this relationship is highly conditional: it depends on several variables, 
most of which are unrelated to the form or content of the communication 
(Valkenburg et al 2016). Whether conduct is truly ‘encouraging’ is thus a difficult 
question, and officials and courts may tend to be unduly risk-averse in their answers. 
Before law-makers criminalise such conduct, they should be satisfied that, in its 





Once again, then, there is no decisive objection to offences of indirect 
endangerment, although there are certainly reasons for caution. The creation of 
these offences can have socially damaging implications. And we can easily conclude 
too quickly that a given type of conduct will actually assist or encourage others to 
cause harm. However, conduct can be wrongful, and can justly be punished, simply 
because it might have this result. If law-makers can address the above concerns, 
offences of indirect endangerment are potentially legitimate.  
 
5. Possession Offences 
 
Despite all the above, however, there remain some inchoate crimes that target 
conduct that seems neither culpable nor wrongful. Consider, for example, offences 
of ‘mere’ or ‘simple’ possession: offences that criminalise the possession of 
dangerous articles such as weapons, without requiring an intention to use the article 
to cause harm. Based on what we’ve seen so far, possession of dangerous articles 
might sometimes be wrongful. For example, it might be part of one’s own plot to 
cause an ultimate harm, or it might unleash an unjustifiable risk that others will use 
the article harmfully. But possession offences also criminalise conduct that involves 
no such plot or risk. Some argue, therefore, that they can be criticised as over-
inclusive: they target a narrow range of wrongful conduct, but do so by criminalising 
a wider range of more easily proven conduct, much of which is entirely innocent 
(Ashworth 2011; Dubber 2005; Husak 2004; compare Baker 2009). They therefore 
risk the unjust conviction and punishment of those have done nothing wrong.  
 
To illustrate this criticism, consider an article whose criminalisation is especially 
controversial: guns. Imagine that you enjoy shooting as a sport, and that you own a 
handgun for this purpose. You have no criminal intentions in which your handgun 
might play a part. Moreover, since you are entirely stable and responsible, you are 
unlikely to develop any such intention in the future. Of course, it is theoretically 
possible that a third party might steal your gun and use it to cause harm. But you are 
alert to this possibility: you keep your gun in a locked case, which you store in a 
safe; and when the gun is out of its case, you never let it out of your hands. Are you 




jurisdictions, you are committing a serious criminal offence, punishable by several 
years’ imprisonment. This, the critics argue, is unjust: in the absence of any 
culpability for the relevant ultimate harm, you simply do not deserve punishment for 
your actions (Husak 2004; 2007, pp. 170-173).  
 
How might proponents of handgun criminalisation respond to this criticism? First, 
they might argue that possessing handguns is indeed wrongful, but in a way that we 
have not considered so far. Some conduct, they might point out, is not wrong in 
itself, but becomes wrongful as a result of its legal regulation. In the familiar jargon: 
there exist not only mala in se offences but also mala prohibita. Sometimes, law-
makers have good reason to use the criminal law as a regulatory tool: to create rules 
that prohibit certain conduct, on pain of punishment, even though that conduct is not 
otherwise wrongful. And sometimes, breach of such rules becomes wrongful, in part 
because they are created and enforced by a competent authority. For example, 
before the state enacts and enforces a tax code, we have no duty to pay specific 
taxes; but once it does, we do. Tax evasion, in other words, becomes a genuine 
malum prohibitum. Once we acknowledge this possibility, the above criticism of 
possession offences is no longer necessarily decisive.  
 
To see why some possession offences might plausibly be seen as genuine mala 
prohibita, return to the example of gun possession. Why might law-makers want to 
criminalise gun possession, when as we have seen, only some instances of such 
conduct are mala in se? The obvious answer is that they might want to disincentivise 
gun ownership. Since guns can cause such serious harm, yet are so easy to use, 
law-makers have strong reason to restrict their availability – not only to prevent 
wrongful types of possession, but also to reduce the risks of (for example) accident, 
suicide, and future wrongful use. Of course, whether legislation can actually achieve 
these aims is a contested question. But there is some evidence that it can: in the 
most comprehensive meta-study to date, relatively strong evidence was found for 
the effectiveness of restrictions on owning and carrying guns (albeit subject to 
serious caveats about methodological challenges: see Santaella-Tenorio et al 2016). 
If this evidence is sound, then law-makers might have good reason to regulate the 
mere possession of guns, since this will prevent more harm than regulating wrongful 





To justify criminalising gun possession, however, not only do law-makers need good 
reasons for regulating this conduct; it must also be wrong for citizens to breach the 
resulting regulation. In this context, breach might be wrongful because of our duties 
to promote one another’s security: if we can take collective action to make each 
other safer, at a sufficiently low cost to our collective liberty, then we ought to do so. 
By criminalising gun possession, law-makers determine one form that such 
collective action will take. Moreover, this determination becomes binding, since our 
security will be enhanced only if enough of us obey the regulation. This argument is, 
of course, controversial: it depends on a particular view of the state’s power to 
obligate its citizens, and any such view will be contested. But for our purposes, it is 
enough that this view is not obviously unreasonable, and seems acceptable from a 
range of political viewpoints. Inchoate crime sceptics should thus take seriously the 
possibility that possession offences – and indeed, offences of other kinds – might be 
justified as mala prohibita (Cornford 2015; for related arguments, see Horder 2012, 
pp. 96-100; Ripstein 1999, pp. 255-260; Tadros 2008, pp. 943-947; 2012, pp. 165-
172). 
 
Admittedly, however, even viewing gun possession as a malum prohibitum offence 
might not completely answer the concern about over-inclusion. Any purported such 
offence will be vulnerable to counter-examples of harmless disobedience: cases 
where a person commits the offence, but without apparently eroding other citizens’ 
security. Imagine again that you are a conscientious gun-owner who enjoys shooting 
for leisure. If the safety measures that you take are sufficiently stringent, then not 
only will you avoid committing any malum in se; you might avoid imposing any risks 
to others’ security at all. In that case, would you have done anything that deserves 
conviction and punishment – even wrongfully breaching a regulation? Again, the 
answer will depend on one’s view of political obligation, but it seems unlikely (Tadros 
2016, pp. 329-332). Even if the above argument is sound, the criminalisation of gun 
possession might thus remain unjustifiably over-inclusive.  
 
This leads us to a second potential argument for the legitimacy of possession 
offences, notwithstanding their over-inclusiveness: sometimes, conduct may 




that non-wrongful conduct may never be criminalised, because when states punish 
their citizens for such conduct, they act unjustly. But arguably, the premise here 
does not entail the conclusion. Even if criminalisation would lead to some unjust 
convictions and punishments, it might still be justified, if there are sufficiently strong 
reasons for criminalisation that outweigh this potential injustice. Although many will 
see this rejection of a ‘wrongness constraint’ on criminalisation as the nuclear option, 
a reasonable case can again be made for it (Cornford 2017; Edwards 2017; Tadros 
2016, pp. 96-100). If the potential for undeserved punishment is sufficiently limited, 
and the reasons for criminalisation sufficiently strong, then over-inclusive 
criminalisation might be justifiable. 
 
These conditions can arguably be satisfied for the criminalisation of gun possession. 
First, law-makers can minimise the impact of such criminalisation on the truly 
innocent: they can offer them controlled and/or conditional access to some types of 
guns, for example, while reserving absolute prohibition for the most dangerous 
types. Second, law-makers have good reasons to define gun possession offences in 
an over-inclusive way: that is, to criminalise possession itself, and not just the 
various types of wrongful possession. These reasons include clarity and ease of 
application, but also preventive efficacy. As we saw above, the criminalisation of 
mere possession will arguably prevent significantly more harm than the 
criminalisation of wrongful possession alone. Increasing the security of the many in 
this way might justify decreasing the security of a few from conviction and 
punishment – especially when these latter harms are easy for citizens to avoid 
(Tadros 2016, pp. 332-333).  
 
By contrast, some other offences of mere possession will not be justifiable in this 
way: in particular, those criminalising articles that are less dangerous than guns. 
Notable examples are the offences created in some jurisdictions that criminalise the 
possession of instructional materials for terrorists, such as training manuals. Law-
makers will struggle to minimise the impact of such offences on the truly innocent, 
since material that assists terrorists will probably also assist ordinary people in some 
ways. Likewise, they have only weak reasons to define these offences in an over-
inclusive way. In this context, criminalising mere possession is unlikely to prevent 




because criminalisation is unlikely actually to reduce the availability of the relevant 
materials. Additionally, the costs of these offences include lengthy prison sentences 
that treat the truly innocent like actual terrorist offenders. These costs are unlikely to 
be outweighed by the modest security benefits of these offences (Cornford 2015, pp. 
23-27; McSherry 2008; Tadros 2008, pp. 965-969).  
 
Overall, then, there is no decisive argument against even these most inchoate of 
inchoate crimes. We surely owe some duties to promote one another’s security, 
which may justify the punishment of some criminal possession. And even potential 
undeserved punishments may be justified by the security benefits of having 
possession offences (although this raises the difficult further question of how severe 
such punishments can legitimately be). The charge that these offences are over-
inclusive certainly demands a serious answer – but the prevention of harm can 
arguably provide that answer. The remaining question for law-makers is how far this 
justification can be stretched.  
 
6. Over-Inclusion in Inchoate Crimes 
 
Preventive efficacy is a tempting rationalisation for over-inclusive crimes. By defining 
offences in an over-inclusive way – for example, by criminalising all gun possession, 
rather than just wrongful gun possession – law-makers can prevent more of the 
ultimate harm with which they are concerned. This is partly because such offences 
might deter a wider range of potentially harmful conduct. But also, they afford wider 
enforcement powers, which can be used to disrupt or incapacitate dangerous actors. 
It is easier, for example, to arrest a potential killer on suspicion of possessing a gun 
than of possessing a gun with intent to kill. Yet as we have seen, there are also 
strong reasons against creating over-inclusive offences. To what extent can 
preventive efficacy justify offences that authorise the conviction and punishment of 
the undeserving? We can answer this question here only superficially, but it is worth 
doing so, since so many recently enacted offences are most charitably seen as over-
inclusive inchoate crimes.  
 
The best-known examples of this phenomenon are offences of abstract or implicit 




making such risk-taking a required element of the offence; instead, they criminalise a 
more specific type of conduct as a proxy for that risk. Textbook examples include 
offences that criminalise exceeding a speed or blood-alcohol limit, in order to target 
dangerous driving; and offences that criminalise sexual contact with persons below 
an age of consent, in order to target the risk of sexual exploitation. However, the 
phenomenon also extends to offences targeting other forms of inchoate wrongdoing. 
Consider crimes of membership in prohibited organisations. These offences 
criminalise the status of membership, in order to target both preparatory conduct in 
which members are involved and their assistance or encouragement of other 
members’ criminal conduct (Levanon 2012). As with offences of implicit 
endangerment, the criminalisation of proxy conduct renders these offences over-
inclusive, relative to the wrongs that they target.  
 
The most familiar justifications for defining offences in such a way are determinacy 
and guidance. If law-makers wish to avoid over-inclusion, then as we have seen, 
they will often have to use indeterminate criteria in defining offences: for example, 
requiring that the targeted risk be unreasonable or unjustifiable. Such indeterminacy 
is bad in itself: it makes official decision-making inefficient and inconsistent, and thus 
makes the law less predictable for citizens. But paradoxically, it can also lead to 
ineffective guidance on when conduct is actually wrongful. We all have biases and 
other cognitive blindspots that lead us to misjudge what is reasonable or justified; to 
help avoid such misjudgements, law-makers thus have reason to avoid relying on 
such indeterminate concepts. For example, as guidance on risky driving, ‘Don’t drive 
drunk’ or ‘Don’t exceed 30 miles per hour in residential areas’ may be more effective 
than simply ‘Don’t drive dangerously’. 
 
Whether over-inclusion of this kind is justified is a question of cost and balance of 
errors. Which is better: to risk inefficiency, unpredictability, and ineffective guidance, 
or to prohibit some conduct that, ideally, the law should not prohibit? This question is 
familiar in the life of the law generally (Alexander and Sherwin 2001; Schauer 1991). 
But once again, many argue that it requires a special answer in the criminal law 
context, where ‘prohibiting’ conduct means authorising its conviction and 
punishment. To convict and punish the undeserving is an infringement of their rights, 




alone. At best, the argument goes, such consequences should be grudgingly 
tolerated, to the extent that they are strictly necessary in achieving sufficient 
determinacy (Alexander and Ferzan 2009, pp. 288-316; Ashworth and Zedner 2014, 
pp. 115-116; Husak 1998; 2007, pp. 153-159; compare Duff 2007, pp. 166-172; 
Simester and von Hirsch 2011, pp. 75-79).  
 
However, in the context of over-inclusion for reasons of prevention, this minimalist 
approach is too simple. Even if there is a single ‘sufficient’ level of determinacy for 
criminal offences, there is no such level of prevention: all else being equal, it is 
always better to prevent more harm. Moreover, as a reason for over-inclusion, the 
prevention of harm is much stronger than determinacy. To the extent that over-
inclusion will actually prevent more harm, there are thus strong reasons in its favour. 
At the same time, of course, greater over-inclusion also generates stronger reasons 
against criminalisation. The more over-inclusive an offence, the more undeserved 
convictions and punishments it authorises – and the more people’s rights will be 
infringed. Again, law-makers are left with a difficult judgement call: balancing some 
citizens’ security from wrongful conviction and punishment against others’ security 
from wrongful harm.  
 
For example, consider speed limits in residential areas. A speed limit of 20 miles per 
hour would greatly reduce pedestrian deaths and injuries, but would also lead to 
many safe drivers being unjustly convicted and punished. A limit of 50 miles per 
hour, meanwhile, would avoid many such unjust convictions, but would also fail to 
prevent most injury-accidents. Or consider the age of consent. An age of 18 would 
catch many exploitative sexual encounters, but would also criminalise the normal 
sexual experiences of most of the population. An age of 12, meanwhile, would avoid 
this result, but would also fail to catch much exploitative conduct. In seeking the right 
compromise in either case, it is unhelpful – perhaps even meaningless – to ask what 
standard is necessary to achieve the offence’s preventive aims.  
 
To add further to this complexity, there are different types of over-inclusive offence – 
some of which are harder to justify than others. So far, we have mainly been 
considering offences that, despite their over-inclusiveness, are meant to lead to the 




makers criminalise gun possession in order to prevent gun-related deaths and 
injuries; but in doing so, they hope that citizens will actually avoid acquiring and 
owning guns, and that those who violate this prohibition will be prosecuted. Like all 
over-inclusive crimes, such offences are difficult to justify, but they at least treat 
citizens with a certain kind of respect. In particular, the guidance that they give is at 
least honest: they are clear as to both the conduct that citizens are expected to 
avoid, and the conduct that officials are expected to pursue, prosecute, and punish.  
 
Some other over-inclusive offences, by contrast, treat citizens less respectfully and 
honestly. These offences are intended not to prevent and punish all the conduct that 
they criminalise, but rather only a sub-set of this conduct. They aim to expand the 
powers of enforcement officials in relation to this sub-set, by making it easier for 
them to arrest, investigate, prosecute, and eventually punish those whom law-
makers really mean to target. For example, when English legislators criminalised 
consensual sexual contact between teenagers, they did not intend to deter 
teenagers from engaging in this conduct – or to facilitate their conviction and 
punishment if they did so. Rather, they intended to make it easier to prosecute 
exploitative forms of sexual contact, by removing requirements like proof of non-
consent. The resulting offence therefore issues guidance that neither citizens nor 
officials are honestly expected to follow.  
 
Over-inclusive crimes of this second type are especially difficult to justify. They carry 
the usual costs of over-inclusion, often to a greater degree: they remove further 
obstacles to unjust conviction, and thus further restrict citizens’ liberties. But they 
also infringe other rights that citizens are often thought to have. Most obviously, they 
undermine an aspect of the rule of law: they deprive citizens of the ability to use the 
law as a guide to what they may and may not do, without becoming liable to 
conviction and punishment. They also undermine procedural justice: they deprive 
defendants of the ability to answer for the conduct that purportedly justifies their 
conviction, and they free prosecutors from having to prove that conduct in court 
(Edwards 2010; Tadros 2008, pp. 951-964). In relation to these offences, citizens’ 
rights against unjust punishment are thus not the only rights at stake – and so we 
must be especially careful before concluding that they are justified by preventive 





Where does all of this leave, for example, offences of membership in prohibited 
organisations? On the one hand, these offences probably prevent significantly more 
harm than offences of preparation, assistance, and encouragement. They deter 
citizens from conduct that – partly because of the organisational context – can easily 
lead to such inchoate wrongdoing, and they empower officials to intervene at an 
earlier stage. Moreover, their costs to citizens’ liberties – of removing the option to 
become a member of a criminal organisation – are relatively low. On the other hand, 
these offences facilitate unjust convictions and punishments: for example, of merely 
passive or nominal members, or of members who are involved only in an 
organisation’s civic or political activities. They can also be used against those whom 
the state really suspects of preparing or assisting crimes, in order to circumvent their 
procedural rights. Arguably, indeed, it is this – and not the deterrence and 
punishment of mere membership – that is the true aim of these offences. Whether 
the efficient prevention of organised criminal activity can justify such infringements of 
citizens’ rights – and if so, just how efficient that prevention needs to be – seems a 




We began by noting that many people are sceptical about the expanding scope of 
inchoate criminality. We can now see that, while this scepticism is in some ways 
well-founded, we should view this expansion with mixed feelings. The scepticism is 
well-founded because criminalisation is indeed unique among the tools available to 
law-makers. Justifying criminalisation means justifying liability to punishment, 
conviction, and enforcement action by state officials – and that is no easy task. Our 
feelings should be mixed because this is not a decisive case, or even a persuasive 
prima facie case, against all inchoate crimes. The prevention of serious harm is a 
powerful justifying aim – and for at least some of the offences considered here, 
criminalisation seems an appropriate means of achieving that aim. Like any 
proposals for new criminal offences, proposals for new inchoate crimes must be 
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